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Introduction 
Over the past ten years the promises and problems of theoretical synthesis have received 
increasing attention in the political science community. For instance, in his 1999 Presidential 
Address to the International Studies Association, Michael Brecher remarked that “the paucity of 
serious attempts at synthesis, or at least complementarity, among contending paradigms is an 
indicator of deep malaise.” (Brecher, 1999: 235). A few years later another ISA President, Steve 
Smith, expressed a different view on the feasibility and desirability of synthesis:  “No research 
agenda can lead to synthesis, simply because different approaches see different worlds”. (Smith, 
2003: 143). Considering contrasting statements such as these, it might seem that, paradoxically, 
the issue of whether and how to pursue theoretical integration has given rise to an additional 
cleavage within an already divided discipline. This conclusion, however, would be unduly 
negative. Many, perhaps most, political scientists would probably subscribe to the position that 
synthesis may be desirable in principle, but its benefits and costs need to be assessed carefully 
and case by case. 
 What seems clear is that there is no universally applicable blueprint for synthesizing 
theoretical approaches. In a landmark analysis of the problem, Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 
(2003) identified four “models of theoretical dialogue”: competitive testing; additive theory 
based on complementary domains of application; sequencing of theories; and subsumption. 
While competitive testing cannot be considered a form of synthesis, determining domains of 
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application and sequencing are two synthetic strategies based on complementarity, and 
subsumption is a form of synthesis that interprets one theory as a special case of another. 
 Theories are not always commensurable and in such cases attempts at integrating them 
are unlikely to improve understanding of the phenomena they refer to. In many cases, however, 
theoretical constructs are sufficiently akin to justify attempts at integration. Given that none of 
the models of dialogue identified by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel is intrinsically preferable to 
the others, scholars interested in integrating theories are left with the task of determining which 
model may be more appropriate in the specific circumstances of the research question. But the 
absence of a set of criteria aimed at clarifying which model of dialogue is best suited to address 
which questions may have the undesirable effect of transforming a sterile clash of monolithic 
theories into an inconclusive discussion over alternative integrative approaches.  
 This article aims at contributing to the development of criteria for synthetic endeavours 
and to show how those criteria can be applied to a specific theoretical debate and empirical 
puzzle. We focus on the choice between two strategies: identifying complementary domains of 
application and showing how one theory subsumes another. In line with the plea of Jupille, 
Caporaso and Checkel, the argument is not developed at the level of meta-theoretical first 
principles, but in relation to specific hypotheses and empirical questions.  
 The standards for assessing the quality of synthetic attempts should not be fundamentally 
different from those employed for evaluating theories. Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003) 
provide a useful (and not necessarily exhaustive) list of standards: logical coherence, parsimony, 
scope, robustness, falsifiability and empirical fit. In this article we focus on two standards, 
theoretical parsimony and empirical fit. The criterion of parsimony entails that subsumption is an 
appropriate strategy for synthesis if, all else being equal, it can be shown that a theory generates 
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the same observable implications of another theory while involving fewer explanatory factors or 
parameters (Occam’s razor). The criterion of empirical fit entails that subsumption is appropriate 
when, for any given phenomenon, the subsuming theory accounts for all its empirical instances 
that can be explained by the subsumed theory, plus additional facts.  Few empirical research 
designs can hope to capture all empirical instances of the phenomena of interest, and this raises 
the problem of the falsifiability of any attempt at synthesis. We address this problem by 
proposing a pragmatic variant of the empirical fit criterion: the subsuming theory should be able 
to account for those instances that are most likely to be explained by the subsumed theory. The 
focus on most likely instances allows researchers to employ a case study approach to questions 
of theory synthesis (George and Bennett, 2005: 253). 
 We apply these criteria to a major debate in international relations theory, which concerns 
the relationship between the neorealist and the neoliberal approaches to international 
cooperation.1 This debate is not only of considerable intrinsic interest but also highly relevant to 
the question of synthesis, since at various stages of the debate key participants espoused one or 
the other of the four models of dialogue identified by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel: competitive 
testing, complementarity based on different domains of application, subsumption of 
neoliberalism under neorealism, and subsumption of neorealism under neoliberalism. In this 
article we apply the criterion of parsimony to the relationship between the two perspectives and 
conclude that subsumption of one theory – neorealism – under the other is theoretically more 
satisfying with respect to the question of cooperation than a synthesis based on different domains 
of application, which has been advocated by various authors. This is because the core variable 
identified by neoliberals – the fear of cheating in an anarchic international environment – 
accounts not only for the cooperation problems faced by absolute-gains seekers, but also those 
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plaguing states that, as neorealists suggest, are concerned about relative gains and thus interested 
in reducing or eliminating them through compensation agreements. 
 Since the theoretical argument of this article identifies neorealism as the subsumed 
theory, the application of the most-likely empirical fit criterion requires the selection of an 
empirical context in which the explanatory power of neorealism is particularly strong. For 
reasons explained below, international politics in eighteenth-century Europe fits neorealist 
assumption particularly well. To give additional credibility to the test, we will focus on two 
states, Austria and Prussia, whose concern for their respective power positions was intense even 
by eighteenth-century standards. The question that we ask is: what explains the pattern of 
successful and failed attempts at cooperation between Austria and Prussia between 1763 and 
1795? More specifically, why did those powers manage to divide up Poland, but not a number of 
coveted territories in Germany? Our findings are particularly revealing because the relationship 
between states aiming for territorial aggrandizement and intensely concerned with relative gains 
is a most likely case for the neorealist approach. 
 The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief summary of the debate 
between neoliberals and neorealists on the implications of relative gains for international 
cooperation and shows how key protagonists saw the relationship between the approaches in 
terms of subsumption or complementarity. The following section develops a theoretical 
argument for subsumption that provides a parsimonious way of integrating the two approaches. 
The last section shows how the proposed integrative framework can account for the pattern of 
success and failure of cooperation attempts by Austria and Prussia in the second half of the 
eighteenth century.  
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Complementarity and subsumption in the neoliberalism-neorealism debate 
Neoliberalism – also knows as neoliberal institutionalism, or rational institutional theory – is 
interested in explaining when and how states succeed in cooperating for mutual advantage 
despite international anarchy, i.e. the absence of a supranational government capable to enforce 
agreements in the international sphere (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986; Martin, 1992; Wallander, 
1999).  If anarchy means that punishment for defection is uncertain, the main problem for 
cooperation is that states may be tempted to exploit the others, even if this may result in 
suboptimal outcomes. According to neoliberals, cooperation for mutual advantage is easier if 
certain conditions are met: notably, if the benefits of defection are not much greater than the 
benefits of cooperation, if actors expect to continue their interaction in the future and if the task 
of negotiating an agreement and sanctioning defectors is not too difficult as a result of large 
numbers of actors and information deficits.  Neoliberals argue also that by manipulating the 
context of interaction – most notably by creating institutions – states may improve the 
informational environment and reduce the opportunities for cheating and free riding. 
Realists responded to the neoliberal analysis by arguing that it underestimates the range of 
problems inhibiting cooperation. They point out that anarchy does not simply mean the absence 
of  a central authority able to enforce agreements, but also the absence of an ultimate protector of 
states, which are therefore compelled to provide for their own security and, ultimately, for their 
own survival. Since a state's ability to threaten the interests of another depends on their 
respective power capabilities, states cannot afford to maximize their gains in absolute terms if 
this decreases their relative power. As Kenneth Waltz argued (1979: 105),  
“when faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel 
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both 
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of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’ If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the 
ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy 
intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for 
both parties does not elicit their cooperation as long as each fears how the other will use 
its increased capabilities”. 
Joseph Grieco (1988, 1990, 1993) elaborated this criticism and pointed out that international 
cooperation is difficult because states are not “rational egoists”, as neoliberals assume, but 
“defensive positionalists”. Defensive positionalists aim to prevent a relative strengthening of 
other states even if this requires them to forego absolute gains, because of the risk that today's 
cooperation partner might become tomorrow's adversary. Including relative gains concerns in the 
calculation of states can substantially modify their attitude to cooperation. This means that, for 
realists, not one but “[t]wo factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and 
concern about cheating” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 51-52, emphasis added). International cooperation 
is therefore more difficult than neoliberals expect, because “states must solve both the cheating 
and the relative gains problem in order to achieve cooperation” (Grieco, 1993: 303, emphasis in 
the original). To be sure, neorealists do not deny that uncertainty about whether the counterpart 
will reciprocate cooperation may be an important factor in states’ calculations. But they stress 
that states will often be reluctant to cooperate even if they could be certain that the counterpart 
will cooperate and that they will gain as a result. “Trust” does not solve the distributional 
conflict. To the extent that states have conflicting interests regarding the distribution of gains, 
cooperation is not necessarily Pareto-improving, as it would be if the key problem was how to 
avoid defection.2      
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Subsequent contributions to the debate highlighted a number of interesting implications. 
Snidal (1991) showed that the impact relative gains concerns on cooperation diminishes with 
increasing numbers of states. Powell (1991) urged focus on constraints facing states, rather than 
their preferences, and showed that even states assumed to be absolute-gains maximizers will 
avoid cooperating in an international context in which the cost of using force is sufficiently low. 
Morrow (1997) noted that states can raise military spending to compensate for increased security 
threats, and thus relative gain concerns and security externalities may block peacetime trade 
among rivals only in unusual circumstances. Grundig (2006) noted that relative gain concerns 
make cooperation more difficult in the provision of non-excludable goods, such as addressing 
climate change, than in the domain of excludable goods, such as trade. Rousseau (2002) 
provided experimental evidence that the importance attached to relative as opposed to absolute 
gains in international relations varies considerably across individuals and is systematically 
affected by factors such as the identity of the opponent.3 
In light of this debate, how can, and should, the relationship between neoliberalism and 
neorealism be conceived? In his in-depth analysis of that relationship, Thies notes that 
“neoliberalism has been presented as virtually identical to neorealism and as its opposite.” (Thies 
2004: 163). Clearly the two approaches have much in common. They are both committed to a 
rationalist mode of analysis. They share assumptions about the key actors in world politics 
(states), their attributes (rational utility-maximizers), and the context of their interaction 
(anarchy). Furthermore, whatever their disagreements over the role of international institutions, 
both realists and neoliberals assume that states have a purely instrumental attitude towards them: 
institutions are useful insofar as they serve interests that states have developed prior to and 
independently of their participation in institutionalized interaction. Not surprisingly, two leading 
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neoliberals have referred to the two approaches as “half-siblings” (Keohane and Martin, 2003: 
81). These commonalities ensure that the two approaches are commensurable and that their 
separate development would thus be undesirable. Indeed, a critic has noted that a “neo-neo 
synthesis” had been established by the early 1990s (Wæver, 1996). 
 One way to interpret the relationship between the two approaches is to apply the first 
model of theoretical dialogue identified by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003), i.e. 
competitive testing. For instance, David Lake implicitly calls for competitive testing when he 
interprets the debate as showing that “it is an empirical question as to which of the two 
approaches might apply in any particular situation.” (Lake, 2002: 149; see also Waever, 1996 
and Rousseau, 2002). Thies (2004) develops an innovative interpretation of the difference 
between the two theories – neorealism is a single screening model with no “memory” of 
cooperative relationships whereas neoliberalism is a repetitive screening system model that 
predicts increasing cooperation over time – and argues that both are internally coherent theories 
whose external validity has to be established through empirical tests (although neoliberalism is 
said to be better equipped to deal with the temporal dimension of state interaction). 
 Other participants in the debate think that some form of closer synthesis is possible and 
desirable at the theoretical level, but there is substantial disagreement over what forms such 
synthesis should take. Broadly speaking, three positions on synthesis have emerged. The first one 
is that neorealism subsumes neoliberalism. Grieco has argued that, “[c]ompared to realist theory, 
neoliberal institutionalism understates the range of uncertainties and risks states believe they 
must overcome to cooperate with others. Hence, realism provides a more comprehensive theory 
of the problem of cooperation than does neoliberal institutionalism” (Grieco, 1988: 131).  In the 
same vein, John Mearsheimer argued that “liberal institutionalism can hardly be called a 
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theoretical alternative to realism, but instead should be seen as subordinate to it” (Mearsheimer, 
1994/1995: 24). The second position is that neoliberalism subsumes neorealism. Robert Keohane 
and Lisa Martin argued that, “[b]y seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can 
have an impact and cooperation can occur, neoliberal theory shows under what conditions realist 
propositions are valid. It is in this sense that institutionalism claims to subsume realism” 
(Keohane and Martin, 1995: 42).   
The third position is that the two approaches are theoretically complementary and neither 
can claim analytical priority or comprehensiveness. A sustained argument for the integration of 
key components of these approaches into an overarching framework has been made by Andreas 
Hasenclever, Peter Meyer and Volker Rittberger (2000). They argue that both perspectives offer 
a partial interpretation of the conditions of cooperation and that an effort at synthesis should 
focus on identifying the different contexts (or “domains of application”, in the terminology of 
Jupille et al., 2003) in which neorealist or neoliberal expectations about cooperation are justified. 
The foundation of their synthesis is a theory of state motivation, which specifies under which 
conditions states are strongly concerned about relative gains (and thus their behavior conforms to 
neorealist expectations) and under which conditions they are interested mainly or exclusively in 
absolute gains (and thus conform to neoliberal expectations).4 Neoliberal hypotheses explain 
international cooperation when absolute gain concerns clearly outweigh relative gains 
considerations, while neorealist analysis is more appropriate when the opposite is the case. In 
this sense, the two approaches are complementary, and constructing a theoretical synthesis 
“becomes a matter of specifying the conditions under which relative gains are severe and the 
conditions under which they are slight or completely dominated by calculations of absolute 
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gains” (Hasenclever et al., 2000: 17). The next section presents an alternative way of 
synthesizing the two approaches.  
 
The theoretical parsimony criterion: relative gains problems as commitment problems 
Some arguments for synthesis based on domains of application assume that the crucial difference 
between neorealism and neoliberalism is that the former stresses the importance of relative gains 
while the latter stresses the importance of absolute gains. However, the core of the neoliberal 
research program is not an assumption about state motivations – that is, the priority of absolute 
gains over relative gains – but the idea that the difficulty of having agreements enforced is the 
crucial obstacle to cooperation under anarchy (a problem summarized by Grieco as “fear of 
cheating”). Neoliberal theory shows under what circumstances these difficulties are more or less 
severe, and specifies the role of institutions in overcoming them, mainly, but not only, by 
enhancing the quality of information available to states. Seen in this light, the crucial question 
raised by the neo-neo debate is not “in which circumstances are states concerned with relative 
gains?” but “in which circumstances can states achieve a mutually acceptable distribution of 
gains, even when they are concerned about relative gains?” In this section we argue that the 
neoliberal research program is able to provide a comprehensive and satisfactory answer to the 
latter, more fundamental question, and that therefore the subsumption of neorealism under 
neoliberalism offers a more parsimonious route to synthesis than the domains-of-application 
route. 
Relative gains concerns are intractable only where there is a combination of very specific 
conditions (Keck, 1993: 53). First, the sensitivity to relative gains must be strong enough to 
override the absolute benefits of cooperation. This sensitivity is the variable that Grieco and 
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others focus on, but three more are often overlooked. Second, the gains from cooperation must 
not be perfectly divisible. If they are perfectly divisible, then states can agree on a distribution 
that preserves the ratio or the absolute difference of power resources between them, or at least 
ensures that any relative gain remains within acceptable limits. Third, side-payments must not be 
feasible. If they were, the state obtaining relative gains from the main transaction could 
compensate the relative losers so as to redress the balance of power. Finally, also issue linkages 
must be impossible. Issue linkage consists in agreeing on and implementing two or more 
cooperation projects that are jointly acceptable to all parties but individually unacceptable to one 
or more of them, for instance because of relative gains concerns. In this article we consider side-
payments and issue-linkage as two different forms of compensation. 
Since even states with a very strong relative gain orientation5 would still be able to cooperate 
if they could transfer side-payments or implement issue-linkages, the “relative gains problems” 
boils down essentially to the question under which conditions compensation is possible. When it 
is possible, any agreement that produces positive absolute gains can lead to a situation in which 
each party has positive absolute gains and relative gains concerns are assuaged. Grieco concedes 
that compensation can solve relative gains problems, but retorts that this solution is not always 
available or effective. He argues that “we know that solutions to relative gains and cheating 
problems sometimes are available and sometimes are not, and we want to know why. We know 
also that solutions to these two types of problems sometimes work and sometimes do not, and 
again we want to understand why” (Grieco, 1993: 320).   
 The key argument of this article is that this question can be answered from within the 
analytical boundaries of neoliberal theory itself. Once the “relative gains problem” is redefined 
as the availability and effectiveness of compensation, as it should be, we no longer have “two 
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types of problems”, but only one: the risk of cheating. This is because the strategic structure of 
compensation agreements is not different from the “games” analyzed by neoliberal theory, 
notably the prisoners’ dilemma and the assurance game. Thus, the “relative gains problem” is 
only a special case of the set of the commitment problems analyzed by neoliberalism, and not an 
additional implication of anarchy, as realists have claimed.6 Since neoliberalism provides the 
conceptual and theoretical tools for answering Grieco’s questions quoted above, subsuming 
neorealism under neoliberalism is the most parsimonious way to synthesize the two approaches.  
 This does not imply that neoliberalism is able to explain 100 per cent of the variance in 
international cooperation.7 States may fail to cooperate over divisible gains, or to overcome 
indivisibilities through compensation agreements, because of a variety of reasons, such as 
bureaucratic politics, failure to accommodate domestic veto players, norms of appropriateness 
that make certain compromises unacceptable, to name just a few factors that may prevent actors 
to cooperate and compensate in many situations. These factors may be emphasized by theories 
that do not depend on the assumptions shared by neoliberalism and neorealism, notably the 
assumption of states as rational unitary actors with exogenously given preferences. Our argument 
that neoliberalism can subsume neorealist explanations based only on relative gains does not 
extend to other theories relevant to cooperation, including – crucially – several realist theories 
that reject, modify, or add to the list of “neo-neo” assumptions. In this sense, the scope of the 
proposed synthesis is limited to the causal conditions identified by the two theories.   
Neoliberalism can determine the conditions under which compensation agreements are 
possible by focusing on the variable that Grieco has rightly stressed as the theoretical core of 
neoliberalism: the fear that the counterpart will cheat. Neoliberalism identifies two sets of 
conditions: on the one hand, those that cause the fear of cheating; on the other hand, those that 
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can mitigate that fear. Considering the first set of conditions, fear of cheating should be minimal 
if the gains from cooperation are perfectly divisible: if this is the case, states can solve the 
relative gains problem by dividing the gains so as to keep any change of relative power within 
acceptable limits, and successful cooperation does not require compensation that may be 
withheld by one party. To keep changes of relative power within mutually acceptable limits may 
mean to aim at preserving the absolute difference of power resources between them, or at 
preserving the original ratio of power resources, or a mix of both.8 The choice is likely to depend 
on whether absolute or percentage advantages in power are perceived as more threatening, which 
– as Mosher (2003: 648-51) notes – is ultimately an empirical question.9 
Some goods, however, are not completely divisible for material or ideational reasons.10 In 
such cases, the parties may agree to redress relative gains through side-payments or issue 
linkage. If the delivery of the side-payment, or of the object of linkage, is simultaneous to the 
main transaction, the opportunity for cheating and consequently the need for trust are 
minimized.11 Indeed, Keohane (1986: 22) notes that “extreme examples of purely simultaneous 
exchange indicate hostility and distrust”. The problem of trust arises when there are “time 
asymmetries in delivery” (Coleman, 1990: 91), which introduce an element of risk for those who 
must deliver their part of the deal before receiving a return. Sequential exchange is more 
demanding in terms of trust than simultaneous exchange: in addition to having to bargain over 
the nature and size of compensation, the actors have to worry about compliance if one or more 
participants would benefit from reneging on their promises. Similarly, redressing relative gains 
through issue linkage sometimes means that different actors “deliver the goods” at different 
times, which increases the opportunities for cheating and therefore the need of trust.  
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In situations in which gains are not perfectly divisible and compensation is not perfectly 
simultaneous, neoliberalism expects the fear of cheating to depend crucially on the (perceived) 
payoff structure. Compensation agreements can be conceptualized as games in which the players 
prefer mutual cooperation (one side accepts the main transaction and the other pays the 
compensation) to no cooperation. To what extent a party fears the other may cheat depends on 
whether it believes that the other party prefers mutual cooperation to unilateral defection or vice 
versa. Assuming symmetry between the players, a preference for mutual cooperation over 
unilateral defection results in an assurance game, whereas a preference for unilateral defection 
over mutual cooperation results in a prisoners’ dilemma. Neoliberals argue that cooperation is 
easier in assurance games than prisoners’ dilemmas, but the actual preference for mutual 
cooperation over unilateral defection will facilitate cooperation only if the counterpart has 
reliable information about this ordering. Possessing credible information about preferences is 
therefore crucial.12 
   In sum, divisibility, simultaneity and the payoff structure determine whether there is fear of 
cheating. Neoliberalism also indicates which conditions may mitigate this fear. Even when all 
actors prefer their own unilateral defection to mutual cooperation – or risk-averse actors must 
assume that this is the case – compensation is still possible when the players expect to continue 
to interact in the future and value the gains from future cooperation highly. In these 
circumstances, cooperation is more likely when states can effectively detect and punish 
defectors. This requires the ability to verify compliance with commitments and the capacity to 
sanction actors that do not comply. Information about behavior is therefore crucial. International 
institutions can mitigate fears of cheating by improving the quality of the information available 
to states. As Keohane noted, “[i]nternational regimes can be thought of as arrangements that 
 16 
facilitate nonsimultaneous exchange” (Keohane, 1984: 129, his emphasis). But also the number 
of actors is important, because both detection and punishment are more difficult when many 
actors are involved. In addition to the problem of cheating, agreements involving side-payments 
or issue linkages face bargaining problems, which have been extensively analyzed by neoliberals 
as well as realists (e.g. Krasner, 1991; Martin, 1992; Fearon, 1998). 
In sum, the neoliberal theoretical framework identifies what generates and what mitigates the 
fear of cheating or, in other words, it shows when trust is necessary for cooperation and what 
may generate the required level of trust. This framework provides the conceptual and theoretical 
tools for examining not only the commitment problems faced by absolute-gains seekers, but also 
those plaguing states concerned about relative gains and thus interested in reducing or 
eliminating them through compensation agreements. Contrary to what leading realists maintain, 
considerations about relative gains are not a further hindrance generated by anarchy 
independently from and in addition to concerns about cheating, because relative gains 
considerations inhibit cooperation only to the extent that states are concerned about cheating. In 
principle states can overcome relative gains problems through compensation, but in practice they 
often fail to do so because compensation agreements are difficult to negotiate and enforce in an 
anarchic international system. Neoliberalism shows that (1) the enforcement problem is a 
variable that depends on a number of circumstances; (2) states can manipulate these 
circumstances to some extent, for instance by improving the availability and quality of 
information through international institutions. To the extent that the neoliberal research program 
is able to specify the conditions under which compensation agreements succeed or fail, it 
subsumes the realist focus on relative gains. 
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The empirical fit criterion: Austro-Prussian cooperation, 1763-1795 
Arguments for subsumption based on theoretical parsimony are unlikely to be fully convincing 
without showing that the synthesis fits the empirical evidence at least as well as the subsumed 
theory. Ideally, this means that the subsuming theory should be able to account for all empirical 
instances that can be explained by the subsumed theory, and more. However, few empirical 
research designs can hope to capture all empirical instances of the phenomena of interest. For 
this reason, requiring a strict application of the empirical fit criterion would make any attempt at 
synthesis exceedingly difficult and, thus, introduce an anti-synthesis bias in the theoretical 
landscape. Instead of expecting that subsumption be empirically verified, therefore, it is more 
fruitful to ask how it could be falsified. An argument for subsumption can be considered 
falsifiable if it is in principle possible to identify (a significant number of) empirical instances 
explained by the subsumed theory but not by the purported subsuming theory. We believe that 
falsifiability can still be ensured through a pragmatic and less demanding variant of the empirical 
fit criterion: the subsuming theory should be able to account for those instances that are most 
likely to be explained by the subsumed theory. If this can be shown to be the case, it would 
support at least a prima facie case for subsumption.  From the perspective of research design and 
case selection, the criterion can be operationalized by means of two general guidelines. First, the 
potential impact of variables falling outside of the purview of both the subsumed and the 
subsuming theory should be controlled for or minimized.  Second, the analysis should focus on 
cases where the causal mechanisms identified by the subsumed theory should be expected to be 
particularly powerful.   
 The application of these rules to the relationship between neorealism and neoliberalism 
suggested to us to analyse Austria’s and Prussia’s attempts to cooperate in the second half of the 
 18 
eighteenth century. These cases comply with the first guideline, since the potential influence of 
“confounding” factors is minimal: most notably, the small circle of decision-makers in those 
states minimizes the impact of bureaucratic politics, absolutist rule in foreign policy reduces the 
effect of pressure-group politics, and the weakness of norms of national self-determination and 
territorial integrity provided little normative resistance to territorial encroachments, swaps, and 
compensations. Both neorealism and neoliberalism tend to assume exogeously given goals, and 
their application in the period under consideration is faciliated by the fact that in the eighteenth 
century the goals of states were relatively well defined as well as compatible with neorealist 
assumptions: most rulers of the time shared the belief of Louis XIV that “to aggrandize oneself is 
the worthiest and most agreeable occupation of a sovereign”. The acquisition and retention of 
territory was the most important objective of foreign policy, and throughout the eighteenth 
century “territories were shuffled around, swopped and bartered in unscrupulous fashion.” 
(Luard, 1992: 202).  In considering possible moves on the diplomatic chessboard, rulers were 
constantly trying to estimate both absolute and relative gains in terms of the size, population, 
revenues and strategic value of territories. 
 Eighteenth-century Austro-Prussian attempt at cooperation also comply with the second 
guideline. In that period relative gain concerns were undoubtedly highly relevant among 
European states, and probably nowhere more than in the relationship between Austria and 
Prussia (see below). Selecting two states with unambiguously high relative gains concerns does 
not only increase the fit with neorealist theory; it also helps address a common problem of 
empirical research on relative gains: when preference rankings are not declared explicitly and 
reliably by the actors, the same behavior at the bargaining table may be interpreted as an 
indication of an interest in the largest possible share of absolute gains as well as the desire to 
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avoid relative losses. This ambiguity presents a significant challenge to the falsifiability of 
explanations based on relative gains. Focusing on eighteenth-century Austria and Prussia 
minimizes this problem because abundant historical evidence shows that the latter motivation 
was undoubtedly important in their relationship 
 We begin with a description of the goals of the two states. Austria and Prussia had a keen 
interest in dividing Germany and Poland between them (Aretin, 1997: 110-111, 173).  They also 
had more specific territorial goals. The Prussians wanted to expand their dominion in western 
Poland, where they particularly coveted the cities of Danzig and Thorn, as well as in southern 
Germany, where they wanted the Franconian margravates of Ansbach and Bayreuth. Other 
territories coveted by the Prussians were Electoral Saxony, Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania 
(Friedrich der Große, 1986 [1768]: 366-376). On the other hand, the Habsburg monarchy was 
especially interested in strengthening its position in southern Germany, notably Bavaria, in order 
to consolidate its scattered possessions, which ranged in the west from its core in Austria and 
Hungary to the Austrian Netherlands. Both states could have attempted to acquire these 
territories through war, but cooperating with one another would have provided a more certain 
and less costly way of territorial expansion at the expense of weaker states.  
 Austria and Prussia had also severe relative gains concerns in relation to each other. They 
were bitter rivals, especially over their relative status in Germany. Paul Schroeder notes that 
“[t]he prime requirement of the balance of power for Austria […] was to prevent Prussia from 
growing in power relative to itself, especially in Germany” (Schroeder, 1994: 14), while Prussia 
had the opposite goal. Both states were concerned about each other’s strength throughout the 
period considered here. In sum, cooperation between the two powers entailed opportunities for 
absolute gains as well as the dreaded possibility of relative losses. 
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 Between 1763 and 1795, Prussia and Austria managed to overcome relative gains 
concerns and achieve absolute gains with regard to the partition of Polish territories, but they 
could not achieve the same result when German territories were involved. Why? The neoliberal 
toolbox can explain this puzzle. We will examine four opportunities for coordinated territorial 
expansion that arose between the end of the Seven Years War and 1795: the First Polish partition 
in 1772, the Austrian attempts to annex Bavaria in the 1770s, the Bavarian exchange plan of 
1792 and the Third Partition of Poland in 1795. We will argue that what made cooperation 
possible in two of those instances and impossible in the other two were the different level of fear 
of cheating in those situations, which in turn depended on the divisibility of the gains and the 
simultaneity of the exchange.  
The first Polish partition, 1772  
The first successful attempt at cooperation was the First Polish partition. An insurrection against 
Russian influence erupted in Poland in 1768 and disturbances in the region of Poland bordering 
Hungary gave the Habsburgs the pretext to occupy at first the county of Spisz and then other 
territories in southern Poland. There were signs that Vienna intended to bring those territories 
permanently under Habsburg rule (Glassl, 1969: 23-50).  Frederick came to see these 
developments as an opportunity to achieve peacefully the long-cherished goal to expand his 
kingdom at the expense of its eastern neighbor. In May 1771 he persuaded the Russian foreign 
minister Nikita Panin that the time was ripe for seeking a negotiated partition of Polish territory. 
The Austrian government heard of the ongoing Prussian-Russian negotiation and started 
considering various options for a partition scheme (Kaplan, 1962: 139-159; Roider, 1982: 133-
138).  In January 1772 prince Kaunitz, the Austrian chancellor, informed Frederick of Vienna’s 
willingness to negotiate the partition, insisting that “perfect equality” of gains was essential: 
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Prussia and Russia would decide what territories they would incorporate and Austria would take 
a portion “directly and equally proportional to the share that Prussia would take” (Kaplan, 1962: 
162). The three countries started negotiations issuing repeated assurances that their relative 
power was not to be altered. Discussions about the relative value of the shares claimed by the 
three powers made up most of the negotiation, with each of them downplaying the economic and 
strategic value of the land it claimed and denouncing the exorbitant nature of the others’ requests 
(Kaplan, 1962: 158-173). As a result of Austria’s superior bargaining power, due to a lesser 
interest in concluding the deal and its determination not to lose ground vis-à-vis Prussia, the 
partition conventions of August 1772 gave Vienna the largest share in terms of area and 
population. However, given the high strategic importance of Prussia’s acquisitions, neither 
Vienna nor Berlin can be said to have obtained significant relative gains from the agreement. 
Cooperation was successful because the Polish territory was considered highly divisible 
by the three powers, which were able to carve out portions of Poland in such a way as to 
determine precisely the size of each power’s (absolute and relative) gains. Given the low level of 
trust among the three states, the simultaneous appropriation of gains was the key factor, since no 
state would have conceded present gains in exchange for future compensation. The powers 
agreed a date for the simultaneous occupation of their acquisitions and this avoided serious 
enforcement problems.     
Bavaria and Ansbach-Bayreuth, 1770s  
As noted above, Austria aimed for the annexation of Bavaria, or at least a portion of it, while 
Frederick aimed at securing the union of Ansbach and Bayreuth to Prussia and possibly the 
annexation of Jülich and Berg. From 1770 onwards the two great powers signaled to each other 
their willingness to negotiate on these issues as part of a general agreement on the division of 
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German territories (Aretin, 1997: 178, 185).  The Polish partition of 1772 unleashed panic in 
Germany since it indicated that the smaller German states risked becoming victims of Prussian 
and Austrian collusion. Indeed, many observers – including the French government – suspected 
that while negotiating the Polish partition Austria and Prussia had reached an agreement also on 
Bavaria, Bayreuth, Ansbach and other territories (Aretin, 1997: 180, 183).13 However, 
negotiations were hindered by the reciprocal mistrust between Frederick on the one hand and 
Kaunitz and the Austrian co-regent Joseph II on the other. Neither the Austrian nor the Prussian 
rulers were willing to defy blatantly the constitution of the German Reich and simply occupy the 
coveted territories, as they had done in Poland. Both preferred to wait for the death of the 
incumbent rulers of those principalities, who were without direct heirs, and then press their 
claims with at least some semblance of legality. At that point, the active cooperation, or at least 
the acquiescence, of the other German great power was highly desirable for both of them, since 
that would have considerably increased the likelihood of success and possibly avoided a war. 
The problem was that no one could have predicted when the succession crises would occur in 
Bavaria and in Ansbach-Beyreuth and, therefore, when either Prussia or Austria would have 
been expected to honor a commitment to support the other. The Austrians and Frederick did not 
trust each other sufficiently to agree to a sequential deal. This enforcement problem reduced the 
incentive to reach an agreement in the first place. Another reason why reciprocal mistrust 
hindered negotiation on German territories is that by presenting written proposals each side 
would have risked having their plans exposed by the other in front of the whole Reich, and 
France, with serious damage for their reputation. “The rivalry of the two German powers was too 
strong, and the trust between them too weak, to allow open negotiations” (Aretin, 1997: 178, see 
also 179 and 184).  
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These problems persisted when a sudden opportunity arose in 1777 for the Austrians to 
achieve their goal, as the succession crisis in the Bavarian branch of the Wittelsbach family 
brought to the throne elector Karl Theodor of the Palatine branch. The Austrian government and 
Karl Theodor had been engaged in complex negotiations about the cession of Bavarian territory 
to Austria (Thomas, 1989). Frederick was aware of these negotiations and was determined to 
prevent Austria from achieving a unilateral gain.  He saw only two methods of doing this: to 
wage war against Austria or to negotiate an agreement that would have secured the margravates 
of Ansbach and Bayreuth for Prussia (Bernard, 1965:  51-74). Such an agreement would have 
ensured absolute gains for both parties and avoided significant relative gains. However, in 
January 1778 Austria tried to create a fait accompli by pressing Karl Theodor into signing a 
convention that ceded one third of the country (Lower Bavaria) to Vienna; additionally, it 
stipulated that any further Austrian acquisition in Bavaria would be compensated in the Austrian 
Netherlands.  At the order of the impatient Joseph, Austrian troops immediately occupied 
Bavarian territory. As a result of this sudden move, Frederick posed as the defender of the Reich 
constitution, and prepared for confrontation with Vienna. The Austrians remained persuaded that 
an agreement could be reached and offered to recognize Prussian claims to Ansbach and 
Bayreuth and other minor territorial adjustments in Germany in exchange for Frederick’s 
acceptance of the Bavarian annexation. Prince Henry and the minister of state Hertzberg advised 
to accept the offer, but Frederick convinced himself that “a second, most secret agreement had 
been negotiated between the Austrians and Karl Theodor in which the latter had agreed to 
surrender all of his possessions to them at a somewhat later time” (Bernard, 1965: 72).  During 
April and May 1778 a number of proposals and counterproposals were exchanged between 
Vienna and Berlin, which involved complex sets of territorial transfers among Austria, Prussia, 
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the Elector Palatine and Saxony. But both sides were reluctant to commit themselves to formal 
proposals because they feared that their counterpart might betray them and publicize the 
agreement. Joseph worried that, if the Prussians made public his proposals, any remaining belief 
in the legality of the convention that had given Lower Bavaria to Austria would be destroyed, 
while Frederick feared that Joseph was not really interested in a settlement and would use the 
negotiation over compensations as a trap to discredit him before the German princes (Aretin, 
1997: 192; Bernard, 1965: 94).  Because both rulers had appealed to Reich legality in presenting 
their claims, they found it difficult to seek a compromise without loss of reputation.14 “However 
passive the role of the Reich during the first phase of the conflict about the Bavarian succession, 
merely by virtue of its existence it prevented an arrangement that would have meant the 
overthrow of the existing territorial property rights” (Aretin, 1997: 192). The failure of the 
negotiation led to the War of Bavarian Succession in 1778.  
The negotiations failed for a number of reasons. First, in Germany the Reich constitution 
made it harder to reach an agreement because it gave some amount of protection to the territorial 
integrity of the smaller principalities, thereby inhibiting precise compensations (Schroeder, 1994: 
28-29).  The consent of several actors would be legally required under the Reich rules, in 
particular that of the heir to the Bavarian throne, the duke of Zweibrücken, who was opposed to 
the cession of Bavaria. In contrast, the Polish Sejm had been forced to agree to the partition by 
means of military threats. Second, neither Frederick nor Joseph was sure that the other preferred 
an agreement to the opportunity to discredit him in front of the German princes and the European 
governments. Third, and most importantly, the exchange could not have been simultaneous, 
neither before 1777 because of uncertainty about the timing and outcome of succession crises in 
the territories concerned, nor after 1777 because Austria had already reached an agreement with 
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the ruler of Bavaria and proceeded to the occupation, while Prussia was merely promised 
compensation at a later stage. A major sequential exchange, however, would have required an 
amount of trust that was wanting between the two actors at the time. In the end, “only the 
insuperable mistrust of the two German great powers averted in 1778-79 the partition of the 
domains of the Wittelsbach, which had been contemplated in Berlin and Vienna” (Aretin, 1992: 
438).   
Bavaria and Danzig-Thorn, 1792 
Austria and Prussia resumed sustained negotiations about the division of Germany and Poland in 
the early 1790s. Discussions about a formal alliance between the two German powers started in 
1791, causing much concern among the smaller German rulers who feared an imminent partition 
of the Reich. In February 1792 Vienna and Berlin agreed to an offensive alliance against 
revolutionary France. The defeat of France was not their ultimate goal but a precondition for 
attaining more general objectives, that is, a general territorial reorganization of central Europe in 
which territorial conquests and financial gains at the expense of France were only one aspect 
(Aretin, 1997: 390; Blanning, 1986:  113-116).  The crucial goal for the Austrians was still the 
acquisition of Bavaria, and they tried to secure Prussia’s cooperation by linking the exchange of 
the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria to acquisitions for Prussia at the expense of Poland. The 
negotiations started in the spring of 1792 and led an initial understanding by which Prussia 
would support the Bavarian exchange and Austria would consent to Prussian gains in Poland, 
notably the annexation of Danzig and Thorn.  
However, at the end the two powers failed to reach an agreement, and this happened 
essentially for two reasons. The first is that both sides were uncertain about the deal that the 
other side would be willing to accept, and this uncertainty encouraged tough bargaining tactics. 
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Influential members of the Austrian State Conference were convinced that the terms of the initial 
agreement would generate excessive relative gains for Prussia, since Austria would be 
exchanging an old possession for a new one while Prussia would be acquiring new territories. To 
assuage these concerns, the Austrian negotiators demanded that Prussia provide what they called 
a “supplement” to Austria, in the form of the margravates of Ansbach and Beyreuth, which had 
recently fallen to Prussia. The Prussians retorted that Bavaria was more valuable to Austria than 
the Netherlands and ruled out the cession of the margravates. Internal documents of the two 
governments show that the Austrian negotiators were prepared to accept an agreement involving 
the Bavarian exchange even without any supplement and that the Prussian king Frederick 
William was inclined to cede the margravates as a side-payment provided that a sufficiently large 
portion of Poland could be secured. But vis-à-vis their counterparts the negotiators maintained 
that no agreement could be reached if their demands were not satisfied, and these claims 
produced a lengthy stalemate that was solved only when the parties managed to agree that 
Austria should obtain the desired supplement not from Prussia but from France, after the armies 
of the two German powers had defeated the Jacobins and conquered Alsace (Lord, 1915: 328, 
331, 338, 348). 
However, ultimately the Bavarian exchange was thwarted by enforcement problems 
rather than bargaining problems. The complex negotiations over indemnities and compensations 
that took place in the spring and summer of 1792 were based on the “principle of complete 
parity: the respective indemnities were to be equal; they were to be gathered in simultaneously; if 
the one proved impracticable, the other must also be abandoned” (Lord, 1915: 357).  This 
principle came to be questioned and finally repudiated by the Prussians. In July 1792 the 
Prussian minister Schulenberg started to suspect that the Austrians were not really interested in 
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an agreement and that their demands concerning the supplement were aimed at sabotaging the 
explicit goal of the alliance – that is, seeking territorial acquisitions as “indemnity” for the costs 
of war against France - “out of a Machiavellian calculation that fifty million more of debts would 
not ruin a state with the resources of Austria, while the same loss would be fatal to Prussia” 
(Lord, 1915: 336).  In other words, Schulenberg suspected that Austria was prepared to accept 
absolute losses in order to achieve relative gains vis-à-vis Prussia. In this “harrowing state of 
suspicion and uncertainty” (Lord, 1915: 336), the Prussian minister decided that Prussia had to 
obtain an indemnity for the cost of the war whatever might happen. He and his colleagues agreed 
that Prussia ought to take possession of its acquisitions in Poland as soon as Russia would 
consent to it; only then would Prussia give Austria any help to achieve the Bavarian exchange 
and possibly allow her to make additional acquisitions if it were clearly proven that a net loss 
would result from the exchange.  
This became the official negotiating position of Prussia after the unexpected defeat of the 
Prussian army at the hand of the French at Valmy in September 1792. After Valmy the Prussians 
were even keener to secure an acquisition that would balance their losses and were unwilling to 
wait until the end of the war with France, which was a precondition for achieving the Bavarian 
exchange and providing the side-payment required by Austria. The Prussians demanded the 
abandonment of the principle of simultaneous gains: Prussia had to obtain its acquisitions at once 
and then help Austria acquiring hers whenever possible (Lord, 1915: 349, 356-357; Schroeder, 
1994: 119).  But the Austrians were unwilling to support Prussia in Poland before they could 
make sure that adequate compensations for Austria were feasible, since they did not want to “end 
up paying the transaction costs and still not getting the transaction” (Schroeder, 1994: 121).  The 
Austrians therefore proposed a plan for the temporary Austrian occupation of a Polish district as 
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a security, which was to be returned to the Polish state in case the acquisition of Bavaria and a 
suitable supplement should later be achieved. This demand was rejected by the Prussians, who 
thought that the Austrian occupation of a Polish district would be unacceptable to Russia and, 
moreover, suspected that the Austrians had presented that demand simply in order to thwart 
Prussian gains entirely (Lord, 1915: 359, 368). If the Austrians had accepted a settlement of the 
Bavarian question in the context of a general reorganization of Europe after the defeat of France, 
cooperation between them and the Prussians would have been feasible. However, given the lack 
of trust between the two powers, and the likelihood of Prussian defection after having secured its 
objectives in Poland, Vienna could not abandon the principle of simultaneous gains, and no 
agreement could therefore be reached.  
The third Polish partition, 1795 
Austro-Prussian cooperation proved thus to be short-lived, but it was soon revived in the last 
Polish partition. Berlin, which had not managed to reach its objectives in Poland by agreement 
with Vienna, switched its allegiance to St. Petersburg. In 1791, the Polish had adopted a new 
Constitution that worried Russia and led to its invasion of Poland. Prussia, despite being still 
formally allied with Poland, joined in the occupation and the Second Partition ensued in 1793, in 
which the Prussia acquired Danzig and the region of Posen (with Thorn) while Russia annexed 
western Ukraine. This agreement behind the back of the Austrians, together with the 
deterioration of the relations between Prussian and Austrian commanders on the western front, 
resulted in severe tensions and increased hostility between Berlin and Vienna.  
Despite these tensions, the Polish reaction to the Second Partition – “Kościuszko’s Uprising” 
– spurred a joint military intervention and preparations for a final and total partition. The 
Austrians realized that they could expect no assistance by Prussia for the attainment of the 
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Bavarian exchange and decided to seek compensation in Poland for Austria’s war effort on the 
western front and for the recent acquisitions of Russia and Prussia (Lukowski, 1999: 1970; 
Roider, 1987: 132-134).  After several months of “acrid negotiations” (Schroeder, 1994, 148), 
during which Austria and Russia reached a bilateral agreement and even deployed troops against 
Prussia, while Prussia concluded a separate peace with France also to strengthen its hand in 
Poland (Moritz, 1968: 186), the three powers concluded a final partition treaty in October 1795. 
Austria acquired Little Poland (with Lublin and Cracow), Russia acquired Lithuania, and Prussia 
acquired Masovia (with Warsaw). By far the most difficult negotiation issue had been the 
palatinate of Cracow: Austria had long-standing claims on that district but Prussia had occupied 
it during the uprising and was determined to keep it (Lord, 1925: 489-490; Moritz, 1968: 167-
190).  The partition treaty finally assigned Cracow to Austria, and the Prussians agreed to 
evacuate it within six weeks: until then Russian troops would remain in Warsaw and other 
territories assigned to Prussia. Moreover, Austrian troops remained in a wedge in Masovia 
between the rivers Vistula and Bug as an additional security. In early January 1796, almost 
simultaneously Prussia evacuated Cracow, Russia evacuated Warsaw and Austria evacuated the 
Masovian wedge (Lukowski, 1999: 179, Góralski, 1971: 216). 
In 1794-96 the Austrians and the Prussians mistrusted each other deeply and were very 
sensitive to relative gains. The Third Partition was successful under these conditions for the same 
reasons that had allowed Prussia, Austria and Russia to accomplish the First Partition. The 
territory of Poland was regarded as highly divisible by the partitioning powers and the 
appropriation of their respective territorial gains could be simultaneous. The most serious 
appropriation problem was created by Prussia holding a valuable territory assigned to Austria 
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(Cracow) and this was successfully solved by making the appropriation of important Prussian 
gains (Warsaw and the Masovian wedge) contingent on Prussia honoring its commitments.  
 In sum, between 1763 and 1795 Austria and Prussia had various opportunities for 
cooperation that would have provided absolute gains for both of them without generating 
significant relative gains. The two great powers managed to exploit these opportunities in Poland 
but not in the German Reich. We have argued that the two powers failed to solve their relative 
gains problem in Germany for the same reason they failed to reap absolute gains: the fear of 
being cheated. Contextual factors - the unwillingness to blatantly violate the rules of the Reich in 
the 1770s and the uncertainties of war in 1792 - meant that Prussia and Austria faced some 
constrains in defining their respective gains and would have been unable to acquire their 
territorial prizes at the same time. In other words, compared to the partitions of Poland, the gains 
from cooperation in Germany were less divisible and their appropriation less simultaneous. 
Either Prussia or Austria would have had to acquiesce to or cooperate in the expansion of the 
other yet remain unsure that the other would (or could) reciprocate. In such circumstances 
cooperation is possible only if the main actors believe that the other side prefers to reciprocate 
cooperation rather than exploit it – that is, if they trust each other. But the required level of trust 
was absent in the relationship between Austria and Prussia.  
Enforcement problems were the main reason for which compensation arrangements involving 
German territories were more difficult to achieve than those involving Poland. But also 
bargaining problems played a part. The unwillingness to defy the Reich constitution too blatantly 
led Austria and Prussia to accept that other interested parties – the rulers of the territories to be 
bartered and their heirs – had some form of veto power, and this complicated negotiations. 
Neither German power had similar scruples in forcing the Poles to acquiesce to the partition of 
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their country. Moreover, mistrust also hindered negotiations because of the risk of being exposed 
vis-à-vis the princes of the Reich by a duplicitous counterpart. To sum up the role of the Reich in 
Austro-Prussian cooperation, it was strong enough to prevent cooperation that clearly violated 
Reich rules, but not strong enough to assuage concerns about defection from agreements that 
were compatible with those rules (territorial exchanges with the consent of the legitimate rulers).  
 Could other factors not captured by neoliberal theory explain this particular pattern of 
success and failure? As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, domestic factors are 
unlikely to have had much influence in this period and these countries, and the historical record 
seems to confirm this. Four factors frequently invoked by realist scholars to explain differences 
in international cooperation – relative gains concerns, relative strength of the parties, fear of a 
common enemy, and diplomatic alignments – also are unable to account for the variation found 
in our cases. First, concerns about relative gains were strong throughout the period. Probably 
they were even stronger in 1795 than in 1792. Second, while the relative power of Prussia vis-à-
vis Austria was stable or declined slightly over the period 1763-1789, cooperation was more 
volatile – successful in 1772 and 1795 with regard to Poland, unsuccessful in the 1770s, 1780s 
and 1790s with regard to Germany. Third, concerns about the power of third parties cannot 
explain by itself the outcomes, since fear of Russian expansionism may have facilitated 
cooperation in 1772 but it did not in 1792. Moreover, if Prussia and Austria had cooperated in 
Poland also for fear of Russia, a fortiori they should have cooperated over German affairs, since 
the coordinated partition of Germany would have produced absolute gains and improved their 
relative power vis-à-vis Russia. Finally, shifting diplomatic alignments are also unable to 
account for the outcomes, since cooperation occurred in times of Prusso-Russian (First Partition) 
as well as Austro-Russian alliance (Third Partition), while it failed in times of Prusso-Russian 
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(Bavarian exchange plan of 1778) and even Austro-Prussian alliance (Bavarian exchange plan of 
1792).  
  
Conclusion 
Since none of the models of dialogue identified by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003) appears 
to be intrinsically preferable to the others, scholars interested in advancing theoretical synthesis 
in political science would benefit from the development of set of criteria for assessing how 
different synthetic strategies might help solve theoretical and empirical puzzles. We focused on 
two criteria, theoretical parsimony and empirical fit, and applied it to a major debate in recent 
political science, the controversy among neoliberals and neorealist on cooperation under 
anarchy. Given the significant similarities between the two approaches, nearly all participants in 
the debate agree that some form of synthesis is possible and desirable, but there is substantial 
disagreement on what the best “neo-neo synthesis” would be: views range from the subsumption 
of neoliberalism under neorealism, through forms of complementarity based on different 
domains of application, to the subsumption of neorealism under neoliberalism. 
 In this article we provided an argument for the last position, on the basis of theoretical 
parsimony. Contrary to the neorealist position, concern for relative gains is not an obstacle to 
cooperation that is independent from and additional to the fear of cheating. States may overcome 
relative gains problems by means of compensation agreements, and this raises two crucial 
questions. First, under what conditions will such agreements be reached? Neoliberalism 
identifies the variables that affect the expectation of reciprocal cooperation versus defection 
under anarchy and thus the viability of specific compensation agreements. Second, are states able 
to manipulate these variables in order to increase the likelihood of cooperation? Neoliberalism 
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shows that states can alter at least one crucial variable – information – by creating and supporting 
international institutions. Since it can be shown that agreements to mitigate relative gains are but 
a special case of the commitment problems analyzed in the neoliberal framework, the most 
parsimonious strategy for synthesis consists in the subsumption of neorealism under 
neoliberalism.  
The examination of attempts at cooperation by Austria and Prussia in the second half of the 
eighteen century has shown that this theoretical parsimony is not achieved at the expense of 
empirical range. The key to explaining why cooperation between Austria and Prussia succeeded 
in some cases and failed in others is not the extent to which they were concerned about relative 
gains, but the extent to which they feared to be cheated in compensation transactions. By 
explaining when this fear was low and hence compensation agreements were possible, neoliberal 
hypotheses provide a satisfactory explanation of the vagaries of cooperation in a historical 
context where neorealist assumptions are particularly plausible. The historical evidence also 
showed that two key factors in the explanation of variation across cases – divisibility and 
simultaneity – depended on ideational and institutional constraints that rationalist approaches 
such as neoliberalism and neorealism may not be well suited to explain. This examination of 
synthesis of two rationalist theories therefore ends by pointing at the possible benefits of 
integrating rationalist and constructivist approaches.   
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1 For various reasons, none of the labels that have been attached to the two approaches is entirely 
satisfactory, and we use the terms neoliberalism and neorealism mainly because they are short 
and well entrenched in the literature (Baldwin, 1993).  
2 Our interpretation of the debate does not rule out that the difference between the two positions 
may be rooted in a deeper divergence in the way the two approaches understand uncertainty (we 
are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this). Rathbun (2007), for instance, 
suggests that for realism states are in constant fear of predation, which leads them to assume the 
worst about other states’ intentions; “rationalism”, on the contrary, is said to have a more 
agnostic conception of uncertainty, according to which states collect and update information 
about intentions and behaviour without making a priori assumptions on the danger posed by 
other states.  
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3 Further contributions to the debate are, among others, Mastanduno 1991; Liberman 1996; 
Matthews 1996; Berejikian 1997; Mosher 2003; Vezirgiannidou 2008. 
4 Berejikian (1997) develops an interesting perspective on state motivation that is based on 
prospect theory. He hypothesizes that states pursue absolute gains when options are framed as a 
choice between gains, whereas states pursue relative gains when options are framed as a choice 
between losses. 
5 Short of an implausibly pure relative gains orientation, where interactions are constant-sum. 
6 James Fearon (1998: 288) also interprets the relative-gains problem as a commitment problem, 
but he points at “states’ inability to commit not to take advantage of greater relative power in the 
future”, whereas we examine the commitment to rebalance gains by means of compensation. 
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the importance of this point. 
8 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to this issue. 
9 Empirical testing may be difficult because in many cases the choice may not be perceived as 
vitally important by decision-makers. This could be because (1) if the initial power gap between 
the states is large compared to the potential gains, they will be less concerned about relative 
gains in general (since such gains are unlikely to make a difference) and specifically less 
concerned about the choice between preserving the ratio and preserving the absolute difference 
of power; (2) if the initial power gap is small, they will be more concerned about relative gains, 
but the distinction between ratio-preserving and difference-preserving methods may be less 
salient as they will yield similar distributions of gains. 
10 As conceived here, indivisibility does not imply nonfungibility, i.e. the belief that a good 
cannot be substituted or exchanged for something of comparable value. For a definition of 
indivisibility that includes nonfungibility (see Hassner, 2003).  
 42 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 In this article trust is simply conceived of as a belief that the other side prefers to reciprocate 
cooperation rather than exploit it (Kydd, 2000; Coleman, 1990).  This is a minimalist definition 
of trust, which denotes the opposite of what Grieco calls “fear of cheating”.  
12 The features of compensation negotiations as games of incomplete information are elaborated 
in a separate paper. 
13 In January 1774 Edmund Burke commented that “Poland was but a breakfast” and wondered 
“where will they dine” (Sutherland, 1960:  514). 
14 These developments confirm Goddard’s (2006) interpretation of indivisibility as constructed 
during the negotiation process and as the unintended effect of legitimation strategies that lock 
actors into bargaining positions from they can no longer recognize any other claim as legitimate. 
 
